privilege should not be extended to governmental entities. In addition, Section II examines current law regarding the claim of privilege by government agencies, addresses the conflict between the privilege and public policies on secrecy in government, and discusses the limits of the analogy between corporations and government agencies.
This Note concludes that extension of the attorney-client privilege to government agencies does not serve the privilege's underlying goals and conflicts with the principle of open government. The courts therefore should not apply the corporate attorney-client privilege to communications between attorneys and government agencies.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Inquiry into attorney-client privilege in the government context must be framed by a general understanding of the evidentiary privilege. Privileges are to be construed narrowly and must be justified by the protection of a special relationship. The traditional purpose of the attorney-client privilege-to promote candor between a client and his legal advisor-has justified extension of the attorney-client privilege to the client corporation.
A. Privileges as Evidentiary Rules of Exclusion
While most rules of evidence are designed to enhance the search for the truth by excluding evidence that is weak or prejudicial, rules of privilege serve substantive goals extrinsic to the litigation. 9 Privileges apply where certain confidential relationships valued by society would be threatened by the general rules requiring disclosure. 1 0 The traditional evidentiary privi- Wigmore discusses the general duty to disclose information needed by the justice system, see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2192, at 70-73, and he notes that only particular extrinsic policies can justify exceptions to the duty to give testimony, id. at 73, § 2285, at 527.
10. Wigmore lists the fundamental conditions necessary to establish a privilege: (1) the communication must originate in confidence; (2) the element of confidentiality must be essential to the "full and satisfactory maintenance" of the relationship in question; (3) the relationship must be one which the community has determined should be "sedulously fostered"; and (4) the injury to the relationship caused by disclosure of the communications would be greater than the benefit of disclosure to the "correct disposal" of litigation. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 527.
Thus, Wigmore formulated the classic justification for evidentiary privileges: privileges should be upheld only where confidential communications occur in a relationship which society desires to foster and where the harm to the relationship from not protecting the confidentiality would be greater than the harm done by suppressing relevant information. This instrumentalist approach to privileges has been challenged by some commentators, who urge that privileges serve the ultimate value of privacy and should not be weighed against litigation interests on a utilitarian scale. See, e.g., Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity 12 relationships by preserving the confidences of the parties to that relationship. 3 The scope of a privilege is shaped by the privilege's purposes. 1 4 For the privilege to apply, confidentiality must be of value to the relationship and must have been preserved in the communication.
1 5 Furthermore, privileges generally yield where the integrity of the relationship already has been defeated by the actions of the parties to the relationship, as where the relationship itself is being litigated. 1 11. The professional relationships most frequently protected by privileges are attorney-client and physician-patient. The physician-patient privilege and the related psychiatrist-patient privilege are discussed in MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § § 98-105. See Privileges deny the finder of fact access to information that may be both relevant and probative. 17 The deleterious effects of evidentiary privileges on the search for the truth urge narrow construction of those privileges. 1 8 Consequently, federal common law 9 essentially incorporates a narrow approach to questions of attorney-client privilege. 2 "
B. Policies Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full and frank communication between clients and their attorneys. 2 ' The privilege is motivated by a concern that apprehension about compelled disclosure by the attorney must be removed to promote candor between client and legal advisor. 2 The client will speak freely with his attorney when assured that his revelations will not be disclosed without his consent; 2 " in turn, this communication allows the attorney to provide informed advice and to function effectively in the adversary legal system. 24 Since the purpose of the privilege is to assure the client that communications with his attorney are confidential, the ability of the individual client to assert or waive the privilege is critical. The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client and the client alone. 2 5 A client may assert the privilege even when not a party to the litigation at hand. 26 The attorney-client privilege for individual criminal defendants has a constitutional foundation in the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 1 However, the attorney-client priv- ilege is not limited to the criminal defendant; indeed, the privilege applies to lawyer-client discussion in numerous contexts." 8
C. Corporate Privilege
It is now universally recognized that the attorney-client privilege applies to corporate clients.-" A corporation may assert the attorney-client privilege to protect the flow of information between the organization and the attorney advising the corporation.° The privilege has been extended to corporations by analogizing organizations to individual clients." Codifications of the attorney-client privilege generally refer to the holder of the privilege as the "client" rather than an "individual," and definitions of "client" in those codifications often explicitly include corporations. 2 When a lawyer represents a corporation, the lawyer's client is the entity itself, not any individual employee, director, or stockholder. 3 31. One author has suggested that the privilege initially was extended to corporations in the nineteenth century because simple business structure and identification of a corporation with its ownermanager gave a corporation a personal identity. corporation retains the attorney-client privilege and may choose to waive the privilege and disclose the information gathered by counsel. 4 Adapting the scope of the privilege to the structure of a corporate "client," which communicates with its attorneys through agents 5 and employees, presents complicated questions."' The "control group" theory for the attorney-client privilege extended the privilege to communications by a corporate employee if the employee was in a position to control the action the corporation might take on the advice of the attorney. However, the individual corporate agents who furnish essential information to the attorney for a corporation often are not empowered to direct the corporation's litigation and therefore inadequately personify the corporate client. In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 8 the Supreme Court extended the federal corporate attorney-client privilege to include a corporate attorney's communications with employees of the corporation outside the corporate managerial control group. 35. In general, communications by a client to his attorney through an agent are privileged. Wigmore indicates, "[tihe client's freedom of communication requires a liberty of employing other means than his own personal action.... A communication, then, by any form of agency employed or set in motion by the client is within the privilege." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2317, at 618 (emphasis in original). Where the agent's principal is a corporation, however, the identity of the "client" becomes complicated. See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348 (discussing special problems applying attorneyclient privilege in corporate context).
36. McCormick describes the problem as one of "extrapolating the essential operating conditions of the privilege from the paradigm case of the traditional individual client who both supplies information to, and receives counsel from, the attorney." MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 87, at 207. Like the individual attorney-client privilege, the corporate privilege is justified as encouraging communication with corporate counsel. 40 However, the incentives are less clear in the corporate context. Since most individual employees of a corporation are not the "client" of the corporate attorney and do not personally hold the privilege with regard to their communications to the attorney, it seems unlikely that the attorney-client privilege provides any incentive for corporate employees to divulge information to the corporate attorney. 4 1 A narrower justification for the corporate privilege responsive to that criticism is that the corporate attorney-client privilege promotes "institutional" communication with counsel. Assurances of confidentiality provide incentives for the organizational client to investigate within its own ranks. The theory is that without the assurance of an absolute privilege, the corporation might not pursue certain inquiries for fear of compelled disclosure." 2 The Supreme Court has endorsed these policy underpinnings for the corporate privilege, noting that the attorney-client privilege for corporations "encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration of justice" by promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and corporate clients. 3
II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE GOVERNMENT CONTEXT
Nearly all decisions concerning the attorney-client privilege for entity clients arise in the context of corporate clients being advised by lawyers. Like corporations, government agencies are entity "clients" that seek legal advice and are parties to litigation."' Although the scope of the attorney- 306 (1984) (arguing that communication-maximizing rationale for privilege should limit privilege to corporate employees who have authority to decide whether their communications may be disclosed by corporation). A pre-Upjohn opinion from the Third Circuit defended the control group theory for the corporate privilege, observing that any offer of confidentiality to lower-echelon employees is "illusory" where the corporation can waive the privilege and turn employees' statements over to law enforcement officials. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1979).
42. See Note, supra note 19, at 670 n.15 (Upjohn management would not have initiated major internal investigation had they believed government would be able to discover information collected). The rationale for the extension of the privilege in the government context is rarely discussed. Prior to general acceptance of the corporate attorney-client privilege, a few commentators suggested that a government entity should have no traditional attorney-client privilege."' The only postUpjohn 4 commentary on the privilege in the government context simply asserts a need of the governmental client for assurances of confidentiality equivalent to a corporation's need for confidential advice. 4 " The cases accepting a governmental attorney-client privilege do not address the policy of this privilege; a functional similarity between public and private bureaucratic organizations usually is assumed with minimal discussion.' 9 professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from him."); UNIF. R. EVID. 502(a)(1), 13 U.L.A. 256 (1986) (same).
But see
As in corporate entity representation, the client of a government attorney is the government as an entity. Corporations and government entities are dissimilar in ways that recommend against applying the corporate attorney-client privilege to governmental agencies.50 Two important factors distinguish the government agency from a private entity client: the public policy against secrecy in governmental affairs, and the differing incentives for internal investigation resulting from the unique public function of the government as a party to civil litigation.
51

A. Open Government and Attorney-Client Privilege
The government has a special responsibility to make available to the public information concerning government operations. 52 The preeminent codification of open government policy is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 53 FOIA provides, inter alia, that agencies shall make government records available to the public upon request. 5 " 4 Agencies may withhold information only in nine specifically exempted categories.
55
FOIA exemption 5 provides that a government agency need not release to the public documents that would not be available "by law" to a private party in litigation with the agency. 56 Exemption 5 insulates agency decisionmaking from premature scrutiny; 57 its protection extends to documents 56. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982) ("This section does not apply to matters that are... inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.").
57. Chief Judge Wald has described the purposes of the government deliberative privilege:
[I]t serves to assure that subordinates within an agency will feel free to provide the decisionmaker with their uninhibited opinions and recommendations without fear of later being subject to public ridicule or criticism; to protect against premature disclosure of proposed poli-revealing deliberative processes 5 " and to the work product of government legal advisors. 59 Exemption 5 also has been found to encompass an attorney-client privilege for communications between agency employees and government attorneys. 6 0 However, it would be a mistake to use exemption 5 to justify a broad attorney-client privilege for government entities. 61 Congressional enactment of FOIA exemption 5 cannot be viewed as a legislative mandate for application of the attorney-client privilege to govcies before they have been finally formulated or adopted; and to protect against confusing the issues and misleading the public by dissemination of documents suggesting reasons and rationales for a course of action which were not in fact the ultimate reasons for the agency's action. Coastal States Gas Corp. v ernmental agencies.62 The suggestion in the legislative history of this exemption that the attorney-client privilege applies to the government as to private parties is, at most, a congressional estimation of the common law of privilege in the government context. 6 " If federal courts were to limit the attorney-client privilege in the government context, FOIA exemptions would be likewise limited. 64 FOIA's text and legislative history therefore do not compel a governmental attorney-client privilege.
Some states have distinguished public agencies from other clients for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, 65 provide in Rule 502 that communications between a public agency and its attorney are not privileged unless a court determines that disclosure will "seriously impair the ability of the public officer or agency to process the claim or conduct a pending "mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory" prepared by government attorney for litigation or adversarial proceeding is temporarily exempt from disclosure under public records law).
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE 145 (1974).
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 1725 investigation, litigation, or proceeding in the public interest." 9 Rule 502's public agency exception to the attorney-client privilege is not universally accepted but has been adopted in some states. 10 
B. Limits to the Corporate Analogy
As a party to litigation, the government entity has a unique public function. The government has an obligation to advance the public interest in litigation, a feature distinguishing government attorneys from attorneys for private parties. 71 The government attorney must seek a fair result beyond, or rather as the ultimate manifestation of, the interests of the government client.
7 2 The government also has a responsibility to act lawfully and to police itself that arguably surpasses any analogous duty on the part 69. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(d)(6), 13A U.L.A. 257, 257-58 (1985) . 70. Maine, Arkansas, and North Dakota are among the states that have adopted Rule 502(d)(6) of the Uniform Rules. See supra note 65. However, Weinstein's survey of state evidence rules indicates that the Revised Uniform Rules of Evidence exception for public agencies frequently is omitted. E.g., 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 2, at 503-S1 (South Dakota privilege rule deletes public entity exception).
71. This public responsibility may even outweigh the government's interest in winning a particular lawsuit:
The United States attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest . . . is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) provides that the duty of a public prosecutor is to "seek justice, not merely to convict." Prosecutors must disclose to the defendant exculpatory evidence. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (prosecutor has constitutional obligation to disclose facts favorable to criminal defendant). Similarly, the government lawyer in a civil action must "seek justice" and avoid unfair settlements or results. 72. The Professional Ethics Committee of the Federal Bar Association described the public trust of the federally employed lawyer:
[T]he government, over-all and in each of its parts, is responsible to the people in our democracy with its representative form of government. Each part of the government has the obligation of carrying out, in the public interest, its assigned responsibility in a manner consistent with the Constitution, and the applicable laws and regulations. In contrast, the private practitioner represents the client's personal or private interest. . . .
[W]e do not suggest, however, that the public is the client as the client concept is usually understood. It is to say that the lawyer's employment requires him to observe in the performance of his professional responsibility the public interest sought to be served by the governmental organization of which he is a part. of private business enterprises. While corporate employees bear no legal responsibility to report wrongdoing," 3 individual employees of the government have obligations to report illegal activity by other government employees. 74 Further, unlike an attorney for a private corporation, the attorney for a government agency has an obligation to act on discovered wrongdoing. 7 5 As in the corporate setting, 78 but to an even greater degree, it is unclear how the attorney-client privilege for governmental entities can promote candor from individuals who are unable to prevent the ultimate waiver of the privilege.
7 7 Given the obligation of government attorneys to report wrongdoing, the legal representative of a government entity cannot assure government employees the degree of confidentiality sufficient to the goals of the attorney-client privilege. Furthermore, in litigation to which the government is a party, some litigation strategy is directed by the legal advisor rather than the client; 78 thus, even government officials in posi- . While some of these ethical and legal provisions for government employees and attorneys and for public agencies may be largely hortatory, they nonetheless are distinctive to the public sphere.
75. FEDERAL ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 4-3 (Fed. B. Ass'n 1973) (federal lawyer has ethical responsibility to disclose information revealing official misconduct), reprinted in Poirier, supra note 72, at 1543; Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (while general ethical obligation of attorney is to maintain confidences of client, attorney may reveal information necessary to "prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm").
76. See Gardner, supra note 31, at 376-84 (arguments against corporate privilege apply in government context); id. at 379 (assumption that privilege applies to governmental bodies is "even more fallacious" than assumption of corporate privilege).
77. Under the "entity" theory of representation for corporations adopted in Upjohn, a government attorney could avoid individual representation of an individual government employee while preserving for the government the attorney-client privilege for communications with the employee. See discussion supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. The applicability of Upjohn in the government context has not been discussed explicitly in federal case law, although McCormick suggests that an analogous rule protecting communications from employees is appropriate for agency situations not involving corporations. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 96, at 233; see also Note, supra note 45.
78. See Weinstein & Crosthwait, Some Reflections on Conflicts Between Government Attorneys and Clients, I ToURo L. REv. 1 (1985) (government attorney's obligation to public requires deci-tions analogous to a corporate "control group" would not have enough control over the litigation to be moved to communicate with the agency's lawyer. Finally, government employees always run the risk that successor officials in a current or later administration will waive the attorney-client privilege covering prior communications with counsel." 9 In sum, entity representation in the government context removes the assurances of confidentiality necessary to promote communications between government attorneys and agency employees. The attorney-client privilege for government agencies therefore cannot be justified as promoting individual disclosures.
Application of the policy justifications for the organizational attorneyclient privilege further distinguishes governmental agencies from private businesses. For corporations, the attorney-client privilege is justified as promoting "entity" communications." 0 Corporations use legal advice" to pursue voluntary compliance with the law and need the attorney-client privilege to encourage internal examinations necessary for such compliance. 2 Such internal investigations generate information that might not otherwise exist and certainly would not otherwise be neatly packaged for adversarial discovery. 8 Keeping such investigations confidential and privileged helps minimize the risk of liability that might result from the release of such information and thus allows corporations to patrol their own wrongdoing. 8 4 The profit motives of corporations distinguish those business entities from government agencies. Corporations have disincentives to investigate not shared by the government, since the ability of a business entity to sionmaking independent of agency client's direction). compete is at risk if wrongdoing is discovered or discoverable." Economic incentives may work in two directions. Where the costs of voluntary compliance are lower than the costs of "involuntary" compliance after discovery by a law enforcement agency or injured plaintiff, corporations may choose to employ internal investigations."' However, economic vulnerability may make a profit-motivated corporation shy away from exposure to liability or adverse publicity. Since the survival of government entities generally does not hinge on competitive success, this incentive to hide (or never to uncover) misconduct is less powerful in the government context." An absolute privilege for communications with counsel therefore is less important in the government's incentive structure than it is in the private sphere. 8 8 In addition, the Supreme Court has suggested that responsibility to the public may defeat evidentiary privileges protecting professional relationships. In United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 9 the Supreme Court declined to extend a work product privilege to public accountants, indicating that an auditor's obligation to serve the public interest distinguishes the accountant from an attorney "whose duty it is to present the client's case in the most favorable possible light." 90 The Court found it significant that accountants perform "a public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client."" 1 The government's public respon- 87. Noneconomic incentives for hiding government misconduct are diffuse and individualized and are not countered by extension of the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERN-MENT passim (1983) (arguing that public officials are risk averse; self-protective official behavior is motivated in part by individual officials' fear of litigation and is best remedied by reform of liability system shifting liability to government entity).
See
88. It might be argued that the privilege nonetheless gives the government some ability and "incentive" to perform internal investigations and should therefore be retained. However, the attorneyclient privilege is an unwieldy mechanism for encouraging governmental self-policing. The scope of the privilege is broad (potentially extending to legal communications with thousands of federal employees) and its protection is absolute, while the benefits are even less clear than in the corporate context. In addition, agencies will not be inhibited from seeking legal advice absent the privilege because other privileges protect intragovernmental communications and attorney work product. sibility is even more manifest than an accountant's, and a governmental attorney-client privilege can be similarly distinguished. An exception to the corporate attorney-client privilege also has been applied where the client asserting the privilege is "an entity which in the performance of its functions acts wholly or partly in the interests of others, and those others, or some of them, seek access to the subject matter of the communications." 92 In Garner v. Wolfinbarger, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that since the management of a corporation has a duty to protect stockholders, stockholders should be permitted to show cause why the attorney-client privilege should not be invoked." Under Garner, an entity acting in the interests of others has a semi-permeable, rather than an absolute, privilege for its communications with counsel. 9 Since the government is properly constrained to act wholly or partly in the interests of the citizenry, 95 the dicta in Garner regarding entity responsibility toward the opposing party suggest that the government's public responsibility makes it appropriate to limit the government's attorney-client privilege." 8
C. Extra-Privilege Protections for Sensitive Information
Denial of the attorney-client privilege to government agencies will not hamper governmental functions or litigation by exposing sensitive communications to public scrutiny. The government enjoys broad protection of its "mental processes" and deliberations which extends to most communications between agencies and their legal advisors. Existing protections, including exemptions to the FOIA, special governmental privileges, and the attorney work product doctrine, offer sufficient protection for the government's legitimate interests in confidentiality.
Communications between the attorney for the government party and his client often will fall within the protection of the attorney work product doctrine."' Under the work product doctrine, an opposing party may not discover the work product of an attorney, including the attorney's ideas and litigation strategy as "reflected . . .in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways."" 8 The doctrine has been extended to the government and protects the government party's strategic interests in litigation." Unlike the attorney-client privilege, 00 the work product doctrine is not an absolute bar to disclosure of the protected communication; an attorney's work product is discoverable upon an adequate showing of necessity.' 1 The work product doctrine thus accords substantial protection to the opinion work product of attorneys for the government distinct from an absolute privilege for attorney-client communications.
A special governmental privilege protects governmental deliberative processes, including the opinions, conclusions, and reasoning of government officials.
1 0 2 This privilege has been extended to consultations between agencies and legal counsel.0' Like the work product privilege, this privilege is not absolute; the protection is weighed in each case and may be countered by a demonstrated need for the information.'" Finally, absolute protection separate from the attorney-client privilege is available for those state secrets which should not be disclosed because of danger to the public interest. Common law and statutory privileges protect military and state secrets, 05 executive information, 0 6 and the identity of informants. 1 07
III. CONCLUSION
As a general rule, privileges should extend no further than the underlying policies require and should be strictly construed in accordance with their purpose. This Note urges the exercise of judicial restraint in the extension of the attorney-client privilege to contexts in which a government agency is the client. 10 8 Although the case law has moved toward extending to government agencies a privilege parallel to the corporate privilege, this trend should be arrested.
An absolute privilege for attorney-client communications in the government context compromises both the logic of the evidentiary privilege and the important public policy of openness in government affairs. Limitation of the attorney-client privilege in the government context would preserve the absolute privilege for circumstances in which it would promote attorney-client communications and aid in the administration of justice. 108. This limitation should not exclude from the privilege communications between a government attorney and a government employee represented in his individual capacity. An attorney for the government may act as the legal representative for a government employee sued or subpoenaed in his individual capacity only where such representation would be in the interest of the United States. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (1987) . Where an attorney employed by the federal government is designated to represent a government employee as an individual, the usual attorney-client relationship arises. Opinion 73-1, supra note 72, at 72-73; FEDERAL ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS Canons 4-4, 6-1, 7-1 (Fed. B. Ass'n 1973), reprinted in Poirier, supra note 72. Since the individual client may retain or waive the attorney-client privilege in accordance with his own interests, the incentives to communicate with counsel are intact and the purposes of the attorney-client privilege are served.
